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Empirical evidence suggests the existence of noncompetitive markets in several
subsectors of the U.S. food industry (SIC 20) (Espinosa and Love; Azzam). Potential
welfare loss resulting from these distortions has led to an extensive literature addressing
market structure and possible social losses.
Most analyses concentrate on one food industry and parametrically estimate price
distortion arising from market power.  However, these estimates are dependent upon
functional form selected and an underlying behavioral model.  As Varian argues,
disentangling hypotheses concerning behavior, market structure, and functional form is
difficult.  Consequently, he argues for first establishing consistency of one’s data with a
behavioral hypothesis.  If, for example, observed production sets are consistent with the
weak axiom of profit maximization (WAPM), then the second step of  estimating a profit
function is appropriate.  If the data fail to satisfy WAPM, then a profit function is
inappropriate and an alternative behavioral assumption consistent with the data should be
found.
In this paper, price distortions arising from market power exertion will be
investigated for 47 subsectors of the U.S. food processing sector using nonparametric
techniques.  The approach allows for both Hicks-neutral and biased technological change.
A series of tests are performed using linear programming techniques to check for3
optimizing behavior under a set of increasingly relaxed technological and market structure
assumptions.
The Nonparametric Approach to the Measurement of Market Power
Generally, market power is defined as the deviation from marginal cost (MC) or
marginal value product (MVP) pricing.  All firms other than perfect competitors may have
some market power, allowing them the potential to exert some influence on the prices they
face.  For a monopolistic firm, this implies that the firm has the power to set output price
above marginal cost (p > MC).  In the case of monopsony, market power is characterized
by a firm’s ability to set an input price lower than its marginal value product (MVP  > r).
One approach to measuring the degree of market power a firm possesses is to measure the
extent to which deviates from marginal revenue. The resulting  Lerner index is the
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In a perfectly competitive situation, price is equated to MC (or MVP) and the Lerner
index equals zero.  As P ( or r) becomes large relative to MC (MVP), the Lerner index
approaches one.  The greater the value of the Lerner index, the greater the potential for
monopoly/monopsony power.
The Lerner index can also be expressed in terms of elasticity of demand.  Profit
maximizing behavior implies that marginal revenue equals marginal cost and  MR = P
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Notice that, the less elastic the demand, the higher the Lerner index and the higher the
degree of market power.

























where C(y) is the cost function of the firm, xn is the quantity of the input presumably
purchased in an imperfectly competitive market,  rn(xn) is the inverse supply function for
the nth input, and e is the elasticity of supply for the n
th input.
Consider the profit maximization problem for the firm facing downward sloping
demand for its output y and an upward supply function for the n
th input:
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where rk  is the price of input k  ,  xkiis the quantity of input k  demanded by firm i,
py i ()  is the inverse demand of the i
th firm and the remaining variables are as defined
previously.  For a technically feasible discrete change in input and output levels, profit-
maximizing behavior requires that:
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where t and s refer to time periods, and pe
tsand rne
ts  reflect producer expectations of prices5
at time t for quantities y
s and xn
s.  For any input and output set optimally chosen at time t,
no other solution, such as (y
s, x
s), will result in higher profit given prices at period  t.
For observed behavior to be consistent with profit maximizing behavior, this inequality
must be satisfied for all s and t.
If the firm is a price taker in all markets, the firm has no influence on the prices by
changing quantities it sells or buys.  In this case, the inequality reduces to Varian’s
WAPM. Alternatively, firms may face subjective demand and supply functions, having
price expectations pe
ts and rne
ts .  The above inequality can be termed the
Monopolistic/Monopsonistic Axiom of Profit Maximization (M/MAPM).  The problem of
whether the data can be rationalized under M/MAPM reduces to the problem of whether
expected output and input prices p
ts and r
ts can be found that satisfy the inequalities.
Let the subjective demand and supply functions be expressed respectively as:
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where mi
ts  and ni
ts, are (respectively) the monopolistic and monopsonistic estimates of
market power and correspond to the magnitudes of the slopes of the demand and supply
curves joining yi
t  and  yi
s and xni
t  and xni
s  at time t.  Substituting the expressions (5) into
the inequality of (4) and rearranging yields:
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Finally, the nonparametric test is modified to permit Hicks neutral technical change in
output following the translating hypothesis favored by  Cox and Chavas.  Technical change6
parameters (ai
t+  and ai
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the price flexibility of the perceived residual supply for input  n facing firm i , and
objection function coefficients bb p n ,,   c , and d  are nonnegative weights.
Under profit maximizing behavior, firm  is ’ first order conditions for input n and
output are: hni
ts
ni n n MVP r r =- () / ,  and k i
ts t
i
t pM Cp =- - [( ) ].  If hni
ts  and k ni
ts  are
simultaneously zero, the above firm exerts no market power in either market.  The firm’s
perceived demand and supply functions are infinitely elastic and the firm will produce
output at the level where  pM CM R == ,  and employ factor input n until MVP r ni n = . If
hni
ts  is zero and  k ni
ts  is greater than zero but less than one, then, the firm is a monopolist
or oligopolist.  On the other hand, if hni
ts  is greater than zero while k ni
ts  is zero, then the7
firm is a monopsonist or oligopsonist.  Finally, if both hni
ts  and k ni
ts  are greater than zero
simultaneously, the firm is considered to have some degree of market power in both
markets.
The Data
Annual time series data were downloaded from the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) Productivity Database website for 47 Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) industries in the 2-digit classification 20 covering 1958-1994.  For each of the
industries, a single output price and quantity is used.  The output  price corresponds to the
price deflator for value of shipments and the quantity of output is the ratio of real output
to the shipment deflator.   Five input measures are used: 1) nonenergy materials, 2)
energy, 3) production labor, 4) nonproduction labor and 5) capital.
Results
The first of the series of  tests conducted analyzed WAPM without technological
change for the sample period and for each industry.  The LP problems yielded  infeasible
solutions for all industries implying that the maintained hypothesis can be firmly rejected
(i.e., our data was inconsistent with the hypothesis of profit maximizing behavior with no
technical change).  The next series of tests allowed technical change to take place in all
industries in the sample.  For all the industries, it was found that the data was consistent
with the specification of Hicks-neutral technology.  Finally, the potential for bias in input
specification was incorporated.  In this case, the maintained hypothesis could also not be
rejected.  Hence, both. Hicks-neutral and biased technical change hypotheses were found
to be consistent with the observed data.8
Tests of Market Power
For the 47 industries considered, evidence suggested that all have some amount of
market power.
1 Table 1 provides the average annual estimates of the
monopoly/monopsony Lerner indexes.  Poultry slaughter (SIC 2015), for example, had an
estimated average markup of 10.18% of output price over MC and a 2% markdown of
material input price under MVP over the 37 year period.  The highest markup was 57.39%
in the Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated Waters (SIC 2086) and the highest
value markdown in the input market was 2% in SIC 2015.  Six industries were identified
as having monopoly power alone.  No industry seemed to have market power in the input
side only.  However, a few industries appear to have had insignificant control over the
prices in either the output and/or input side, perhaps due to the relatively small sizes of
these industries.
Sample Results: Meat Packing
The beef packing (2011) industry has been extensively analyzed in the literature.  Annual
results for this industry is discussed to illustrate the sample results.
Moderate distortion from competitive pricing was found in the beef packing
industry in both output and input (nonenergy material) markets.  The same conclusion was
reached by Azzam and Pogolatous (1990).
                                                        
1 The calibration process required choice of suitable weights for the model.  In this


















Lerner Index for Meat Packing Industry
Figure 1.  Lerner indexes for meat packing (SIC 2011).
Between 1961 to 1971, the input and output pricing distortions appear to have
moved together.  Peaks simultaneously  occurred in  1962 and 1966.  However, from
1974 to 1978, the industry appears to have had significantly higher monopoly power than
monopsony.  This was a period of rapidly increasing per capita beef consumption.  Retail
weight consumption increased from 80.5 pounds in 1973 to 94.2 pounds in 1976.  By
1979, per capita consumption had fallen to 78.0 pounds.  In 1979, monopoly power fell by
83 percent and has since remained relatively steady.  Interestingly, the monopsony power
has been fluctuating within 25 percent level for more than a decade, and also has been
consistently above the monopoly power during the observed period.  Both estimates,
however, are small since 1979, indicating little apparent price distortion in this industry.
Deadweight Loss Estimates
Table 1 also contains estimates of the deadweight loss to U.S. consumers and the
material input suppliers from market power in the food processing sector. Without10
additional information on costs and production, constant MC and MVP functions were
assumed and Harberger triangles were calculated given the slopes of the output demand
and input demand curves resulting from solution of the LP problems. The estimates
indicate significant losses in some industries.  For instance, an average $5 billion loss was
estimated in the Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated Waters (BCSDCW)
industry over the sample period.  This was the largest amount observed.  Meat packing
losses were about $585 and $369 million in the output and material input markets,
respectively.  Several industries (e.g., SIC 2083, 2097) had small losses in one or both
markets, reflecting either the small markets in which these firms operate and/or small
calculated values of the Lerner indexes.
Summary
Nonparametric procedures were developed in this paper to determine market
power exertions by industries in SIC 20. The existing nonparametric tests were expanded
in two ways.  First, the concept of subjective demand was used to derive the M/MAPM
and then imbedded in the hypotheses of linear demand and supply functions for the tests of
market power.  Second, welfare measures arising from market power were calculated
using the knowledge of the slopes of the demand and supply functions.  For the sample
period and for each industry evidence of noncompetitiveness was found.
Six industries were characterized as monopolies only and the remaining 41 had
some degree of market power in both input and output markets.  The degrees of power
varies from low to almost none.  These results confirmed the hypothesis of Hick’s neutral
technical change as well as price distortions in the industries.11
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Table 5.2 Annual Average Lerner Indexes and Deadweight Losses ($millions),  1958-1994
Output Market Material Input Market
Lerner Index Deadweight Loss Lerner Index Deadweight Loss
2011 Meat packing 0.0283 585 0.0183 369
2013 Sausages 0.2971 1167 0.0151 82
2015 Poultry Slaughter 0.1018 327 0.0200 40
2017 Not available 0.0210 18 0.0069 2
2021 Creamy Butter 0.0204 22 0.0000 .02
2022 NPT Cheese DCED P 0.5714 2883 0.0020 9
2023 DCED Products 0.1410 334 0.0004 .6
2024 ICF Deserts 0.0354 66 0.0003 .3
2026 Fluid Milk 0.0441 406 0.0016 11
2032 Canned Specialties 0.0814 190 0.0018 2
2033 CFVPJJ 0.1091 603 0.0014 4
2034 DDFVSM 0.0134 11 0.0002 .1
2035 PFVVSSS 0.0681 146 0.0022 2
2037 FFFJV 0.1767 403 0.0028 5
2038 CFPFVFS 0.2674 1020 0.0000 .1
2041 Flour/OGMP 0.0108 24 0.0020 4
2043 Cereal Bkfst Food 0.2649 670 0.0000 0
2044 Rice Milling 0.0185 9 0.0187 8
2045 PFM 0.0274 30 0.0018 .4
2046 Wet Corn Milling 0.0152 19 0.0050 .2
2047 Dog-Cat FD 0.0528 57 0.0000 14
2048 PFFI 0.0371 135 0.0000 .4
2051 Bread/OBP 0.1712 1294 0.0002 0
2052 Cookies-Crackers 0.2186 651 0.0000 0
2061 Cane Sugar/ERF 0.0175 9 0.0002 .1
2062 Cane Sugar RF 0.0920 179 0.0000 .01
2063 Beet Sugar 0.0183 17 0.0004 .2
2064 Candy/OC 0.2150 838 0.0001 .2
2066 Chocolate/CP 0.0385 49 0.0002 2
2067 Chewing Gum 0.0330 20 0.0000 .03
2074 Cottonseed/OM 0.0171 7 0.0004 .2
2075 Soybean OM 0.0439 162 0.0001 3
2076 VOM/ECCS 0.0032 4 0.0029 4
2077 Animal-Marine FO 0.0202 5 0.0002 .5
2079 STMOEONEC 0.0049 110 0.0002 .3
2082 Malt Beverages 0.0039 121 0.0008 3.4
2083 Malt 0.0032 .7 0.0172 .2
2084 WBBS 0.0129 9 0.0002 .2
2085 Distilled BL 0.0390 40 0.0024 2
2086 BCSDCW 0.5739 5015 0.0013 4
2087 FEFS/NEC 0.0836 93 0.0005 .4
2091 CCFS 0.1373 133 0.0003 .1
2092 PFFS 0.4078 888 0.0000 0
2095 Roasted Coffee 0.1166 413 0.0158 42
2097 Manufactured Ice 0.0205 4 0.0024 .2
2098 MSVN 0.0659 41 0.0038 1
2099 Food Prep./NEC 0.2827 2045 0.0089 32